Thoughts on Sam Harris's The Moral Landscape

In 2010, Sam Harris published a book titled The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values. The general premise of the book is that morality is something objective that we can determine based on scientific fact. The book has been generally negatively received by ethical philosophers, but well received by figures associated with "the New Atheism" such as Richard Dawkins.

First of all, I agree with Sam Harris that morality is not relative. If you read any of his book, it should be the first chapter in which he debunks relativism and establishes a level of realism in ethics. Harris rejects the is-ought distinction and the naturalistic fallacy, and maintains that science can tell us about what establishes well-being. Well being is the foundation for his ethical theory, or perhaps more properly stated, the goal. Harris contends that a science of morality can investigate what causes better human well being, and that those discoveries should influence our moral opinions. In other words, the fact that we want to have a better life is taken for granted here, which I do not have a problem with, but I do take issue with his utilitarian like method of finding out what well being is. Even the most skeptical scientist admits that science is imperfect, which is inevitable due to the nature of the inductive logic by which it operates, so one is always left with the problem of knowing whether or not one truly knows the best way to live. Harris gets around this by proposing that there is a "Moral Landscape" which represents "peaks and valleys", with the higher peaks being the best ways to live, and the valleys representing the worst. This is a rather contentious solution to the problem, but those with deontological ethical views will see a serious issue here. I imagine Utilitarians would have less of a problem.

His discussion on the notion of free will is intersting. I agree with Harris that the modern scientific picture of the world and mind leave little room for the notion of free will. Harris tries to defend the idea that moral responsibility is compatible with this deterministic view, but I do not think he succedes very well. Michael Gazzaniga does a much better job defending the idea of moral responsibility given the deterministic account of the mind in chapters 6, 7, and 8 of The Ethical Brain, as well as in his book Who's in Charge?: Free Will and the Science of the Brain. Interestingly enough, in the notes section of the book Harris refers to his arguments from The Ethical Brain. For the record, Gazzaniga maintains that moral responsibility is something found between people in a social context, not between brains. For Gazzaniga, freedom and responsibility are moral concepts, not physical or metaphysical ones. Harris maintains that he is not advocating a fatalist view, which is the hardest of hard deterministic views; fatalism maintains that reality is the way it is out of necessity, that it could not be other than it is. Harris still seems to represent a rather "hard determinist" view, which I think is a bit excessive. After all, the purpose of our evolved brains is to be able to make choices. Are these choices free from the causal change of the universe, or completely independent from one's life experiences, genetic predispositions and such? Of course not. Yet we are capable of making choices out of many, many, possibilities. It's not exactly clear what "free will" really means, either. Is free the same as random? We wouldn't want our choices to be random and impulsive. Generally, when someone's thoughts are random and incoherent, or impulsive and uncontrolled, they are thought to be mentally ill. In this regard we should be thankful that our brains are not "free", if "free" means random. In any case, if that is what free will is supposed to mean, then it is clearly false. If by free will one means not being compelled by another person or situation, then we do have some capacity of freedom. This is the compatibilist view, and although it is often criticized as re-defining the problem, I think it has merit. Aristotle's discussion of voluntary and involuntary actions seems to fit well with this view, which can be found in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics. 

Due to his rejection of free will, Harris also rejects the concept of retributive or "revenge" justice. This is the notion of  an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, or in our times, perhaps "a 5 year sentence for a breaking and entering" and so forth. While he does NOT go so far as to say we should not imprison anyone, he does maintain that if a cure for certain antisocial behaviors is ever found, that these should be used instead of ordinary punishment. Perhaps so, and in theory I have no problems with this, but I am skeptical that such a thing could ever occur. It's hard to imagine that there will be a pill to cure rapists, pedophiles, or serial murderers, but if there were, I see no problems in using such a thing, provided that the offender is made to recompensate society for their troubles, perhaps through community service, and are kept tabs on by a parole officer and are made to see a therapist. When dealing with criminals, we must remember that the purpose of justice, regardless whether you take a rehabilitational or retributive stance, is to keep that person from re-offending.

His views of "well being" being the goal of morality are not unlike the view of Aristotle, who proposed the goal of ethics is "eudamonia", or the good life. However, Aristotle's solution simply involved observing how two extremes lead to problems, and taking the middle path. This is a far more practical approach than the utilitarian like approach of Sam Harris. Harris's views are not very different from those of Michael Shermer's in his book The Science of Good and Evil, but I think that Shermer is a better writer and makes a better case. Nor can Harris's views tell us whether or not we should consider animals in our views, and all become vegetarians. Nor can he tell us whether or not we are justified in killing one person to save many, or if doing something dishonest for the greater well being of mankind is justified.  In the end, contrary to Dawkins's claims on the back cover, I hardly think that moral philosophers will "find their world exhilaratingly turned upside down," but there are far worse books you could read.

Recommended Reading: The Ethical Brain and Who's In Charge? by Michael Gazzaniga, The Science of Good and Evil by Michael Shermer, Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle, and The Right and the Good by W.D. Ross