Would Plato eat at Chic-Fil-A?

A discussion with a friend of mine about the recent events with Chic-Fil-A supporting anti-gay rights groups got me thinking about a metaphor of Plato's from The Republic. As much as I hate to "jump on the bandwagon", this does give a great opportunity to discuss some important philosophical questions pertaining to morality and discrimination.

While I myself am not a Platonist (I'm a modern, reformed Aristotelian, if I had to put a label on my thought), Plato does have some interesting things to say about the subject of discrimination. The original context of the discussion concerns the role of women in The Republic, in Book V beginning around line 454. The discussion occurs between Glaucon and Socrates. Since this is pulled from the middle of a text, I will bold the lines Socrates says. For those unfamiliar with Plato, Plato did not simply write out his views, but used his mentor Socrates as a character to express his own views in dialogue form with other characters, often based on real life Greek political figures or philosophers.

Ah! Glaucon, great is the power of the craft of disputation.

Why is that?

Because many fall into it against their wills. They think they are having

not a quarrel but a conversation, because they are unable to examine what

has been said by dividing it up according to forms. Hence, they pursue

mere verbal contradictions of what has been said and have a quarrel rather

than a conversation.

That does happen to lots of people, but it isn’t happening to us at the

moment, is it?

It most certainly is, for it looks to me, at any rate, as though we are 

falling into disputation against our will.

How?

We’re bravely, but in a quarrelsome and merely verbal fashion, pursuing

the principle that natures that aren’t the same must follow different ways

of life. But when we assigned different ways of life to different natures

and the same ones to the same, we didn’t at all examine the form of natural

difference and sameness we had in mind or in what regard we were

distinguishing them.

No, we didn’t look into that.

Therefore, we might just as well, it seems, ask ourselves whether the

natures of bald and long-haired men are the same or opposite. And, when

we agree that they are opposite, then, if the bald ones are cobblers, we

ought to forbid the long-haired ones to be cobblers, and if the long-haired

ones are cobblers, we ought to forbid this to the bald ones.

That would indeed be ridiculous.

And aren’t we in this ridiculous position because at that time we did

not introduce every form of difference and sameness in nature, but focused

on the one form of sameness and difference that was relevant to the

particular ways of life themselves? We meant, for example, that a male

and female doctor have souls of the same nature. Or don’t you think so?

I do.

But a doctor and a carpenter have different ones?

Completely different, surely.

Therefore, if the male sex is seen to be different from the female with

regard to a particular craft or way of life, we’ll say that the relevant one

must be assigned to it. But if it’s apparent that they differ only in this

respect, that the females bear children while the males beget them, we’ll

say that there has been no kind of proof that women are different from

e men with respect to what we’re talking about, and we’ll continue to believe

that our guardians and their wives must have the same way of life.

And rightly so.

Next, we’ll tell anyone who holds the opposite view to instruct us in

this: With regard to what craft or way of life involved in the constitution

of the city are the natures of men and women not the same but different?

That’s a fair question, at any rate.

And perhaps he’d say, just as you did a moment ago, that it isn’t easy

to give an immediate answer, but with enough consideration it should not

be difficult.

Yes, he might say that.

Shall we ask the one who raises this objection to follow us and see

whether we can show him that no way of life concerned with the management of the city is peculiar to women?

Of course.

- Plato 454-455b, translation by G.M.A. Grube, revised by C.D.C. Reeve (Hackett, 1992)

Now that you have read the dialogue, what does this mean? The scene begins with Socrates commenting to Glaucon that the power of disputation (the ability to argue logically) is a great gift, because people often think they are merely having a conversation, they are in fact disagreeing and because they lack the skills to construct logical arguments, end up disagreeing over mere terminology and end up playing what are essentially word games; perhaps, a reference to what today we call the informal fallacies.Glaucon then worries that this is what is occurring between him and Socrates, and Socrates confirms the worry. Socrates says that they have not discussed how they are differentiating the ways in which people are alike or different from each other, and how this should play a role in deciding what role people ought to have in society. Socrates gives the example of two cobblers, one who is bald, and one who is not bald. Socrates says that if baldness is an essential part of being a cobbler, then the cobbler with hair should not be allowed to work as a cobbler. Glaucon agrees that this would be ridiculous. Socrates adds that this absurdity arose because they did not consider every way in which things can be alike and different. Socrates asks if Glaucon does not agree that a male and female doctor have the same type of soul. Think of it as, do a male and female doctor both not need the same kind of devotion to be able to be a good doctor? Glaucon responds that male and female doctors do have the same kind of soul. Socrates then asks if doctors and carpenters do not have the same soul. Glaucon responds that they are certainly a different kind of soul. In other words, the professions of being a doctor and being a carpenter take a different kind of person to do the job well. Socrates the points out that men and women different in respect to doing these things in terms of accidental physical properties. Men beget children, and women bear children. Socrates concludes that these differences are simply irrelevant to the discussion of whether or not women would be suitable guardians (to put this in context, a guardian is a philosopher-monarch of Plato's ideal Republic).

The metaphor here is brilliant. Just as baldness and having hair are just physical traits that do not affect someone's ability to be a cobbler, neither does the role one plays in the creation of children affect the ability to be a wise person capable of ruling a state. What does this have to do with gay rights, though?


If it is not fair to judge someone's capacity to perform a task based on their physical appearance, then it is not fair to judge anyone based on contingent properties about them. That is, it is not fair to judge people about things that they cannot help. After all, physical traits are just a specific type of thing of a larger category of things that people cannot help. Since it is in fact unfair to judge someone's ability to do a job based on their physical appearance, then it is not fair to judge someone based on contingent properties about them. (This is deduced by the rule of inference known as modus ponens). 

A contingent property, as I said, is something about someone that is accidental, that they cannot help. This is a general ethical principle, that you shouldn't judge someone about something they cannot help. After all, it is only voluntary actions that should be criticized morally. This is hinted at here by Plato speaking through Socrates, and was later solidified as an ethical principle by Aristotle. Aristotle wrote that, "Virtue, then, is about feelings and actions. These receive praise or blame if they are voluntary, but pardon, and sometimes even pity, if they are involuntary." (Aristotle, 1109b30) Aristotle goes onto specify that the key difference between a voluntary action and an involuntary action is that an involuntary action is one done out of external physical forces or out of ignorance of how to act during a situation. For example, if you choose to murder someone to obtain their money, that is a voluntary choice. If you burn down a house while sleepwalking, that is involuntary. What of cases where you are compelled to do something wrong by someone else or some external cause, but choose to do it anyway, for example, if your family is kidnapped and you are forced to do something horrible to have them returned safely, and you choose to do the horrible thing to save your family? Aristotle calls these non-voluntary actions. (For more information, see the Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, chapter 1)

How then, does this relate to discrimination? Discrimination occurs when someone is excluded from positive treatment or given negative treatment over something that they cannot help. Essentially, it is punishment for something that they cannot control, or over something that is not a matter of moral concern, such as the religion they practice (unless their religious practices involve immoral behavior) This can occur over skin color, gender, sexuality, and so on.

Some maintain that homosexuality is a choice, and use that as a basis for discriminating against them. Such people often point out that homosexality does not occur in nature. In fact, it does, as discussed in Bruce Bagemihl's book Biological Excubrence: Animal Homosexuality and Natural Diversity.  A recent study even found that deleting a certain gene in a rat's DNA can cause them to be homosexual, showing that homosexuality can be caused by a genetic mutation. There even appear to be physical differences between a person of a gender who is straight, and one who is not. This can be seen here at wikipedia, with multiple citations for each fact for those who would like to investigate. (I'd like to avoid the "appeal to wikipedia", so please, do check out the citations).

It is evident, then, that homosexuality is not a choice. This can be found simply by asking anyone about their sexuality. Regardless of your own sexuality, ask yourself, "Did I choose to like the gender I like, or did it come naturally to me?"

Since homosexuality is not a choice, it is not something someone can help. From Plato's point of view, it is something that is an accident of someone's nature, and does not affect their ability to do anything, just as being bald or having hair does not affect someone's ability to be a cobbler. Plato would most likely be very opposed to laws such as "don't ask, don't tell" which, until President Obama had it disposed of, was a law that prevented homosexuals from openly serving in the military. Plato would fully support Obama's decision to get rid of the law, as it deemed them from being unfit to participate in the activities of the state for something irrelevant. From Aristotle's point of view, being homosexual isn't a voluntary choice, and since only voluntary choices are in the scope of ethical judgement, homosexuality falls outside the scope of ethical judgement. There is, however, a distinction from desiring to do something, and doing something. Homosexual acts do not violate any ethical duty. If in a mature, consenting relationship, a homosexual act is no different than a heterosexual act between two consenting people of proper age, since both acts are not treating someone as a mere means to an end, and no harm is being done. So, while homosexuality itself may be involuntary, the voluntary act of homosexual relations still does not seem to violate any ethical rules (unless, you wish to argue that any sex that does not result in procreation is a sin, in which case, the gender of the person with whom you are having sex is not relevant. Nevertheless, I do not believe that sex outside of attempts at procreation is wrong.)

I hope then, it is clear that discrimination against homosexuals or any other group of people, is morally wrong. Ideally, this would be intuitively obvious to people, just as it is intuitively obvious to many people that racism is wrong. If it is not intuitively obvious that discrimination is wrong to someone, against homosexuals or otherwise, I doubt that my arguments here would do anything to change the way that person thinks, but I thought it a good opportunity to explore the issue. As to the title of the blog post, I doubt that Plato would eat at Chic-fil-a, if for no other reason, than he would probably find their food to be quite distant from approximating the form of the good meal.